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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
We are asked to determine whether the district court 
abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees and costs to 
a "prevailing party" under the Equal Access to Justice Act 
("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. S 2412. Terence D. Morgan, a former 
Master Sergeant in the United States Marine Corps,filed a 
civil action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 
the defendants for alleged violations of his constitutional 
rights. 
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After a non-jury trial, the district court found that all but 
one of his claims were without merit, and awarded Morgan 
declaratory and equitable relief based upon the single 
meritorious claim. However, in a subsequent fee application 
under the EAJA, the court held that the government's 
position in defending Morgan's due process claim was 
substantially justified and denied Morgan's claim for 
attorney's fees and costs. This appeal followed. For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
The circumstances leading up to this suit are as complex 
as they are intricate. The district court correctly stated that 
"[t]he factual allegations of plaintiff's complaint are too 
lengthy to summarize. However, the essence of the 
complaint is a wide-ranging conspiracy among various 
officers of the United States Marine Corps to `ruin 
[plaintiff's] reputation.' " Dist. Ct. EAJA Op. at 2. The 
government's investigation of Morgan centered upon 
allegations of recruiting fraud; however, our analysis must 
focus on the agency decision that resulted in this appeal. 
That decision resulted from a military prosecutor's 
assertion that he had a "gray book" that purportedly 
contained evidence that Morgan was involved in illegal 
gambling. In order to understand the significance of the 
"gray book" and its impact on Morgan's claim for costs and 
fees under the EJAJ it is necessary to detail the events 
leading up to this appeal and the structure of the Marine 
Corps' recruiting efforts at some length.1  
 
A. 
 
Terence D. Morgan joined the United States Marine Corps 
in September, 1973. After receiving various promotions, he 
was ordered to the Greensburg substation of Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania Recruiting Station ("RS") in June of 1980. RS 
Pittsburgh is part of the 4th Marine Corps District, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Morgan did not appeal from the district court's decision on the merits 
of his claim. Consequently, the recitation of the facts is taken from the 
district court's merits opinion. 
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headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The 4th 
Marine Corps District in turn is part of the Eastern 
Recruiting Region, which is headquartered at Parris Island, 
South Carolina. Major General Jarvis D. Lynch, Jr., became 
the Commanding General of the Eastern Recruiting Region 
and Parris Island on October 5, 1988. Colonel David A. 
Jones was then the Director of the 4th Marine Corps 
District, which encompasses nine recruiting stations in 
seven states. 
 
A recruiting station is operated by a Command Group. 
During the periods relevant to this appeal, Major George A. 
Eberhart, Jr., was the Commanding Officer. A recruiting 
station is organized around recruiting substations, which 
are recruiting facilities manned by one or more full-time 
recruiters. A recruiting substation is under the direct 
operational and administrative control of the recruiting 
station and is supervised by a Non-Commissioned Officer in 
Charge ("NCOIC"). A Command Group's main concern is 
ensuring that the recruiting station makes its "mission", 
i.e., procures a specified number of new recruits who are 
willing and eligible to enlist, and to ship a specified number 
of these new recruits for basic training. Recruiters are rated 
largely by the number of recruits they enlist in the Marines. 
 
Normally, an applicant must have a high school diploma 
to enlist in the Marine Corps. A General Equivalency 
Diploma ("GED") is not acceptable. Recruiters are permitted 
to place eligible recruits who are willing to ship to basic 
training within 365 days of signing the enlistment contract 
into the Delay Entry Program ("DEP"). High school seniors 
who anticipate graduating within one year are also 
permitted to sign enlistment contracts and enter the DEP 
pool. These "poolees" sign a contract evidencing their intent 
to be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
("UCMJ"). In addition, people with temporary medical 
conditions that preclude immediate shipment for basic 
training, and people with other non-permanent 
disqualifications, are allowed to sign enlistment contracts 
and enter the DEP pool. A large DEP pool enhances a 
recruiting station's ability to meet its monthly shipping 
mission. A DEP pool containing poolees who are not 
qualified to join the Corps for some reason, such as the 
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lack of a high school diploma or a disqualifying medical 
condition, is referred to as a "dirty pool". 
 
A recruiter prepares a package for each "poolee" 
including inter alia, a high school diploma, social security 
card, birth certificate and medical form. Recruit packages 
are the direct responsibility of the individual recruiter, the 
NCOIC of the recruiting substation, the Commanding 
Officer, the Operations Officer and the "MEPS" liaison.2 
 
Morgan was selected "Rookie Recruiter of the Year" after 
his first year of recruiting duty in 1983, and promoted to 
the rank of NCOIC of the Greensburg substation of RS 
Pittsburgh. In 1984, he was named "Non-Commissioned 
Officer (`NC0') of the Year." In late 1985, Morgan was 
promoted to the rank of Assistant Recruiting Instructor for 
RS Pittsburgh. Master Sergeant ("MSG") Eugene Zuro was 
then the Recruiting Instructor of RS Pittsburgh; however, 
Morgan replaced him in January of 1986. The Recruiting 
Instructor is the most senior professional recruiter in a 
recruiting station, but need not be the most senior NCO 
within the recruiting station. The Recruiting Instructor 
travels throughout the recruiting station to train recruiters 
in sales techniques and the completion of paperwork, and 
provides assistance to recruiters who are having trouble 
making "mission." For our purposes, it is important to note 
that the Recruiting Instructor has no duty to verify recruit 
packages. 
 
B. 
 
In 1984 and 1985, RS Pittsburgh ranked first in the 
nation in recruiting. It was then under the command of 
Major J. P. Walsh. In 1986, Major Eberhart became the 
Commanding Officer and he was determined to continue 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. "MEPS" is the abbreviation for Military Entrance Processing System, 
which is a service shared by all branches of the military that recruit 
applicants. It conducts medical exams, administers tests and otherwise 
processes applicants. The MEPS liaison is the quality control person for 
the Commanding Officer of a recruiting station. He or she is not a 
member of the Command Group and does not have to make "mission". 
Rather, the MEPS liaison's prime concern is to ensure adherence to 
military regulations. Dist. Ct. Merits Opn. at 6. 
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that success. This created tremendous pressure to"make 
mission." 
 
Despite Eberhart's determination to continue the 
Recruiting Station's success, RS Pittsburgh barely made its 
mission in September, 1988, and by October 1, 1988, RS 
Pittsburgh was in serious trouble. In response to the 
decreasing number of recruits, the station began enlisting 
and shipping qualified recruits to Parris Island for basic 
training within 30 days of their enrollment. This procedure 
was known as "direct ship mode." However, it is difficult for 
a recruiting station to meet its monthly mission by 
operating in "direct ship mode." 
 
Morgan began inspecting recruit packages that had been 
prepared at RS Pittsburgh and he discovered that 350 
documents were missing from those packages, including 
high school diploma verifications.3 The Marine Corps has 
strict regulations regarding education verification, and 
recruiters are required to obtain a high school counselor's 
signature or a school seal on a copy of the applicant's 
transcript or diploma before an applicant is processed for 
shipping to Parris Island. The large number of missing 
documents caused Morgan to ask Eberhart to conduct an 
inspection, but Eberhart merely responded by assuring 
Morgan that he would "take care of [the recruiter in 
question]," and refused to make an inspection. 
 
Despite Eberhart's assurances, Morgan called Zuro, the 
former Recruiting Instructor of RS Pittsburgh, and a 
member of the Contact Team for the 4th Marine Corps  
District.4 Morgan told Zuro that RS Pittsburgh was in 
"direct ship" mode; that documents were missing from 
recruit packages; that Eberhart was submitting false 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Testimony at trial established that all recruiting stations have 
documents missing from recruit packages. However, it was unusual to 
have 300 to 400 missing documents unless the size of the DEP pool was 
very large. 
 
4. Contact Teams are comprised of a small group of individuals who are 
experts in the field of recruiting. The Team provides guidance to 
recruiting stations and is required to visit each recruiting station twice 
a year. They conduct investigations, and also provide guidance. Dist. Ct. 
Merits Opn. at 10, n.9. 
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information to the 4th Marine Corps District concerning the 
number of DEP pool discharges and the need for direct ship 
applicants; and that he was having serious arguments with 
Eberhart. Zuro told Morgan that he would visit RS 
Pittsburgh at the end of October, 1988, which was 
apparently the Contact Team's next regularly scheduled 
visit to RS Pittsburgh. 
 
C. 
 
At the end of October, 1988, the Contact Team visited RS 
Pittsburgh. Morgan and First Lieutenant Brown, the 
Operations Officer of RS Pittsburgh, compiled a list of 
pending DEP pool discharges, missing documents and 
other problems. Morgan informed the Team of numerous 
improprieties and/or problems, including Eberhart's refusal 
to discipline recruiters, Eberhart's use of threats to 
enhance recruiting and his practice of requiring that 
recruiters be in their offices from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. 
Zuro responded by telling Morgan that the Contact Team 
would not conduct an inspection of RS Pittsburgh during 
the visit. Zuro apparently believed it was more important to 
provide additional training. 
 
On November 1, 1988, Captain Hoffman, the officer in 
charge of the Contact Team, prepared a memorandum for 
Colonel David A. Jones, Director of the 4th Marine Corps 
District, concerning the Contact Team's October visit to RS 
Pittsburgh. The memo discussed the DEP pool problems at 
RS Pittsburgh and described the training that was provided 
by the Contact Team. A reorganization of the structure of 
the substations of RS Pittsburgh was "highly recommended 
to avoid further turmoil and maximize prospecting." In early 
November, 1988, Colonel Jones called Eberhart to discuss 
his concern about the number of discharges in the DEP 
pool. Eberhart acknowledged that he had to take some 
discharges, but said that the DEP pool would be"cleaned 
up" in the next few months. 
 
Nevertheless, Colonel Jones remained concerned about 
the problems in RS Pittsburgh and sent Colonel 
Niewenhous, Executive Officer of the 4th Marine Corps 
District, to talk to Eberhart. Niewenhous met with 
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Eberhart, but Eberhart vehemently denied that there were 
problems in RS Pittsburgh. 
 
When General Lynch became the Commanding General of 
the Eastern Recruiting Region and Parris Island in early 
October, 1988, he had no experience in recruiting, and he 
requested a briefing on the subject. He subsequently 
received, and reviewed, a detailed briefing, but was not sure 
that the problems at RS Pittsburgh were caused by 
misconduct or ineptitude. Accordingly, he ordered Colonel 
C.R. Casey, his Deputy Chief of Staff for Recruiting, to 
investigate the situation and remedy it. The ensuing 
investigation stemmed solely from the detailed briefing 
General Lynch had received from his staff and was totally 
unrelated to Morgan's complaints about missing 
documents, and the high rate of discharges from the DEP 
pool maintained by RS Pittsburgh. In fact, Lynch did not 
know Morgan and had never been informed about Morgan's 
complaints. 
 
D. 
 
About the same time that Lynch was being briefed, 
George Sens, a new recruit from RS Pittsburgh, was 
shipped to Parris Island for basic training. After he 
reported, Sens admitted that he had a bleeding ulcer. That 
medical condition should have precluded his enlistment in 
the Marines. Sens said that he had informed his recruiter 
of his medical condition, and had been told not to tell the 
doctors at Parris Island. Based on Sens' statement, other 
recruits who had been shipped for basic training from RS 
Pittsburgh were interviewed. During those interviews, 
approximately 80 recruits made allegations of recruiting 
misconduct at RS Pittsburgh. 
 
On Friday, January 27, 1989, Colonel Jones, Director of 
the 4th Marine Corps District, received a telephone call 
from Colonel Casey, General Lynch's Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Recruiting, regarding the allegations of recruiting 
misconduct by RS Pittsburgh's recruiters. Jones was 
instructed to send out a team to investigate, and, on 
Saturday, January 28, 1989, he assembled an investigating 
team. The Senior Investigating Officer was Lieutenant 
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Colonel John Spencer Evans, and the team included 
Captain D.J. Koleos, a lawyer who was assigned to provide 
legal advice to the investigating team. Koleos was Deputy 
Staff Judge Advocate for the Eastern Recruiting Region, and 
it is his actions that would later be the basis for the relief 
the district court afforded Morgan. 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Evans team began its investigation in 
Pittsburgh on the morning of Monday, January 30, 1989. 
Captain Evans,5 who was a member of Lieutenant Colonel 
Evans investigation team, read each individual who was 
interviewed, his or her rights under Article 31 of the UCMJ, 
10 U.S.C. S 831. Those rights are similar to Miranda 
warnings. No allegations of recruiting misconduct had been 
made against Morgan prior to the Evans investigation. 
Indeed, Morgan was initially elated because he assumed the 
investigation was in response to his complaints. 
 
However, an applicant named Michael Lockwood was 
processed at RS Pittsburgh during Evans' investigation. 
When Lockwood was confronted with a false high school 
diploma that was part of his recruit package, he said that 
Morgan had procured the false diploma for him. Lockwood 
then identified Morgan's picture from a group photograph of 
the members of RS Pittsburgh. He also identified Morgan in 
Colonel Evans' presence, and stated that Morgan was the 
Marine who had sold him the false diploma. 
 
Morgan denied this allegation and told Colonel Evans 
that he had never seen Lockwood before. Another member 
of the investigating team, Master Sergeant Cawman, then 
accused Morgan of having a printing press in his basement. 
Morgan said that allegation was ludicrous, and requested 
legal counsel. Captain Evans responded by telling Morgan 
that he was a legal advisor. Morgan then talked to Captain 
Evans for 30 to 45 minutes.6 During that conversation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. There are two officers named Evans who figure in this case. 
Lieutenant Colonel John Spenser Evans was the head of the 
investigating team and Captain John E. Evans was a member of that 
team. To avoid any possible confusion, we will indicate each Evans by 
rank when reference is made to him. 
 
6. Captain Evans was not an attorney. Apparently, he served as an 
advisor to the Commanding Officer in the area of personnel 
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Morgan told Evans that he never met Lockwood and that he 
had not created any false high school diplomas. On 
February 2, 1989, Morgan made a written statement to that 
effect in response to a request from Evans that he do so. 
Morgan was not provided independent legal counsel. 
 
E. 
 
Colonel Evans completed his investigation and prepared 
a report for Colonel Jones. Evans' report concluded that 
administrative procedures were not in place at RS 
Pittsburgh to insure that quality control of recruits received 
as much emphasis as recruiting and shipping them. The 
report alluded to the existence of various factions of 
"cliques" at RS Pittsburgh, concluded that Morgan was the 
leader of one of these "cliques," and that his "clique" 
appeared to be at the center of the bulk of recruiter 
malpractice there. Colonel Evans opined that Morgan, "[i]n 
his capacity as the senior expert on enlisted recruiting, . . . 
bears a tremendous amount of responsibility for the 
problems in Pittsburgh." Although Colonel Evans was not 
personally convinced that Morgan had made a false 
diploma as alleged by Lockwood, he did not doubt that 
Morgan knew that diplomas and other documents were 
being falsified. The report rejected Morgan's claim that he 
lacked the training and experience to identify and deal with 
the problems in RS Pittsburgh. 
 
Colonel Evans recommended various forms of discipline 
for 29 Marines at RS Pittsburgh, including members of the 
Command Group and recruiters. The recommended 
discipline ranged from nonjudicial punishment ("NJP")7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
administration, and advised the Commanding Officer on legal matters. 
Evans claims that he never represented himself to Morgan as an 
attorney. However, Morgan's testimony to the contrary was corroborated 
by other recruiters of RS Pittsburgh who also testified that Captain 
Evans led them to believe that he was acting as their legal counsel 
during the investigation. Moreover, although the district court did not 
make a specific finding of fact as to this conflict in the testimony, it 
is 
clear from the court's opinion that it credited Morgan's testimony on this 
point despite Evans' denial. See Dist. Ct. Opn. at 16-17, n.19. 
7. Nonjudicial punishment is governed by Article 15 of the UCMJ, 10 
U.S.C. S 815. It is a summary procedure designed to allow a commander 
to quickly impose minor punishment for minor offenses committed by 
members of his command. See generally, DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY 
CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SS 3-1 to 3-8 (4th ed. 1996). 
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such as letters of caution, to summary8  and special court- 
martials.9 Evans also recommended that Major Eberhart be 
relieved of duty despite Evans' belief that Eberhart did not 
intentionally direct the enlistment of any unqualified 
applicant into the Marine Corps. 
 
Evans' report contained findings of fact with respect to 
members of the Command Group and the recruiters for 
whom Evans recommended disciplinary action. Colonel 
Evans found that Morgan was involved in the procurement 
of false diplomas for several recruits. The allegations as to 
one recruit, Wayne Bellew, were corroborated by Bellew's 
civilian wife, Tracey. Another recruiter stated that Morgan 
was responsible for the improper education verification for 
a recruit named Angela Robinson. Evans also found that 
Morgan improperly administered the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery test ("ASVAB") to two Marine 
Corps personnel and that he routinely used his 
government-owned car for personal business. The report 
noted that Morgan denied all of the allegations. 
 
General Lynch was not satisfied with the report because 
it did not address the failure of the Command Group of RS 
Pittsburgh to fulfill its responsibilities. Consequently, he 
directed his Deputy Chief of Staff for Recruiting, Colonel 
Casey, to go to RS Pittsburgh to conduct a further 
investigation focusing on the Command Group. The Casey 
investigation team conducted numerous interviews at RS 
Pittsburgh, and issued a report noting the numerous 
allegations of misconduct against persons in the recruiting 
station. However, most were not corroborated by 
independent facts, and, typically, the allegations were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. A summary court-martial is designed to dispose of minor offenses in 
a simplified proceeding. SCHLUETER, supra note 9, S 1-8(D)(1). The 
maximum punishment that may be imposed includes confinement at 
hard labor for one month, forfeiture of two-thirds of one month's pay for 
one month, hard labor without confinement for 45 days or restriction for 
two months. 10 U.S.C. S 820. 
 
9. A special court-martial is the intermediate court in the military's 
judicial structure. 10 U.S.C. S 816; SCHLUETER, supra note 9, S 1-8(D)(2). 
Maximum punishments include confinement at hard labor for 6 months 
and forfeiture of two-thirds of one month's pay for 6 months. A bad 
conduct discharge may also be assessed. 10 U.S.C.S 819. 
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refuted by the alleged perpetrator. To further complicate the 
situation, the accusers were often biased. Accordingly, 
Casey resolved uncorroborated allegations in favor of the 
accused. Though there was evidence of criminal conduct 
and dereliction of duty, Colonel Casey was convinced that 
the problems in RS Pittsburgh were the result of leadership 
failure. 
 
Casey did, however, believe that Morgan deliberately 
helped recruiters falsely enlist high school juniors into the 
DEP; that Morgan created high school diplomas for the 
purpose of unlawfully enlisting unqualified applicants into 
the Marine Corps; that Morgan solicited a man named 
Jerry L. Williams to join in his criminal enterprise; that 
Morgan communicated a threat to Williams; and that 
Morgan gave a false statement to Colonel Evans during his 
investigation of RS Pittsburgh. Based on his findings, 
Colonel Casey recommended that Morgan's alleged 
recruiting misconduct be investigated pursuant to Article 
32 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. S 832, the military counterpart 
to a civilian grand jury. 
 
Jerry L. Williams was a civilian who owned a printing 
shop called Precision Printing in Bedford, Pennsylvania. 
During the Evans investigation, several recruiters alleged 
that the services of Precision Printing had been utilized to 
make false diplomas for certain recruiters. Because these 
allegations were unsubstantiated in the Evans' 
investigation, Major Kelley, the legal advisor for the Casey 
investigation, directed Captain Koleos to contact Williams. 
Koleos did so and prepared a "Results of Interview of Mr. 
Jerry Williams, Owner of Precision Printing" which was 
made part of Colonel Casey's report. 
 
In his report, Koleos stated that Williams accused 
Morgan of coercing him to create fraudulent documents for 
recruits who were not qualified for the Marine Corps. 
According to Koleos' report, Williams said that Morgan paid 
him to alter the names on original diplomas. Koleos' report 
stated that Williams, his wife and other employees could 
positively identify Morgan and the corporal who 
accompanied him when Morgan visited Williams' print shop.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. At trial, Koleos contradicted the information contained in his 
"Results". Koleos testified that Williams could not remember the name of 
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F. 
 
When Morgan learned of these allegations he called 
Captain Louis J. Puleo, a defense attorney at Parris Island. 
In March, 1989, Puleo assigned himself to be Morgan's 
defense counsel. On March 22, 1989, Corporal Palmer, one 
of the two recruiters who had implicated Morgan in 
recruiting fraud, told Puleo that the statements he had 
given to the Evans' investigating team regarding Morgan's 
involvement in recruiting fraud were false. 
 
On March 27, 1989, numerous charges were preferred 11 
against Morgan for violations of various provisions of the 
UCMJ.12 He was charged with engaging in fraudulent 
recruiting practices on several, enumerated occasions 
(Charges I & III), improper administration of the ASVAB test 
(Charge III), making false statements regarding drug use of 
members of a recruiting substation (Charge IV), presenting 
a false claim for travel expenses (Charge V), and making a 
false statement under oath (Charge VI). 
 
On March 28, 1989, Koleos interviewed Palmer, and 
Palmer told him that the statements he gave during the 
Evans' investigation were false. Koleos responded by telling 
Palmer that he would have to call Colonel Evans and 
Captain Evans. However, Palmer exercised his Article 31 
rights under the UCMJ and spoke with his defense counsel, 
First Lieutenant Ansa. After speaking with Ansa, Palmer 
decided to remain silent. In response, Koleos implied that 
Palmer's record would suffer and Palmer may be disciplined 
if Palmer said anything against Colonel Evans or Captain 
Evans. 
 
Nonetheless, despite Koleos purported threat, Palmer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the Marine who had come to his shop for a false diploma. However, 
Koleos did testify that William's description of the Marine who came to 
his shop fit Morgan's description. 
 
11. The preferring of charges is the first formal step in prosecuting a 
criminal case under the UCMJ. For a discussion of the process, see 
SCHLUETER, supra note 9, S 6-1. 
 
12. Specifically, Articles 80, 81, 84, 92 and 134 of the UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. 
SS 880, 881, 884, 892 and 934. 
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made a statement on March 29, 1989. In that statement 
Palmer declared: 
 
       I was interviewed by Captain Koleos. During my 
       conversation with the Captain, I made it clear that I 
       was going to say things in court that would incriminate 
       LtCol. Evans and Capt Evans, because I recanted my 
       statements [to them]. The reason I recanted my 
       statement is that they were made under pressure and 
       I was cohersed (sic) and told by [both] Evans what to 
       say there-for (sic), making them false statements. 
       During my conversation with. . . Koleos he made it 
       unmistakably (sic) clear that if I did not stick with my 
       first two statements (which were false), that the 
       sentence of my February 24, 1989 NJP would be 
       vacated, which means a reduction in rank and 
       forfeiture (sic) in pay. This came across to me as a 
       threat. 
 
        I am making this statement because I know that I 
       will eventually have to make these statements in court 
       and I know that they will vacate my sentence. And I 
       want to have record of my knowledge of this prior to it 
       happening. 
 
        What I am saying is true and I do not feel an 
       innocent man should be judged on statements that 
       someone was pressured into making. 
 
This statement was incorporated into a Stipulation for 
Morgan's upcoming Article 32 hearing.13  
 
Similarly, Williams (the owner of Precision Printing whose 
accusations are set forth above) testified at a deposition 
and denied ever incriminating Morgan. He stated that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. An Article 32 Investigation, 10 U.S.C. S 832, is, as noted earlier, 
the 
military counterpart to the civilian grand jury. According to the Manual 
for Courts-Martial (MCM), United States (1995 Edition), "[t]he primary 
purpose of [the Article 32 Investigation] is to inquire into the truth of 
the 
matters set forth in the charges, the form of the charges, and to secure 
information on which to determine what disposition should be made of 
the case." See Rules for Courts-Martial ("R.C.M.") 405(a), Discussion. No 
charge may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until an 
Article 
32 investigation has been conducted. 10 U.S.C. S 832(a). 
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investigators were trying to "get the goods" on Morgan, but 
that he, Williams, could not assist them because he did not 
know Morgan and had never seen him. He flatly denied ever 
making the inculpatory statements against Morgan that 
Koleos had reported. On the contrary, Williams swore that 
he could not link Morgan to any fraudulent diplomas. 
 
Williams testified that, on the contrary, it was the 
investigators who did the threatening. They purportedly told 
Williams that he was also under investigation; that he 
could be charged as a result of the investigation; and that 
the FBI might be notified of his conduct. Williams also 
testified that he had refused to sign a statement that Koleos 
had prepared which identified Morgan as the Marine who 
was coming into his shop for false diplomas. 
 
Puleo was able to interview several key witnesses before 
the Article 32 hearing. The majority of them were Marine 
Corps applicants, who not only absolved Morgan of 
wrongdoing, but also identified other Marines who were 
involved in the recruiting fraud. In addition, they either 
stated that they had been pressured into implicating 
Morgan or denied making statements that had been 
credited to them in which they purportedly accused Morgan 
of improper conduct. 
 
G. 
 
The Article 32 investigation took place in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, on April 2 and 3, 1989. Major Ellen B. Healy 
was designated the Investigating Officer,14 Captain Koleos 
was the government's counsel, and Captain Puleo was 
Morgan's counsel. Much of the testimony at that hearing 
exonerated Morgan. At the conclusion of the investigation, 
Major Healy prepared a report in which she stated that the 
government was not able to present key testimony, and 
that, with the exception of allegations relating to Charge III 
(the wrongful enlistment of a particular recruit), the 
charges against Morgan were not supported by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The Investigating Officer is appointed by the commanding officer. 
R.C.M. 405(d)(1). He or she conducts the investigation and makes a 
report of conclusions and recommendations. Id.  
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evidence. Moreover, the testimony as to even that charge 
was equivocal. The prosecution had produced testimony 
that Morgan directed a recruiter to fill out a false education 
verification. However, the witness stated that Morgan 
directed him to verify it the following day. 
 
Based on the evidence at that hearing, Healy 
recommended that Morgan be subjected to NJP, the lowest 
form of punishment under the UCMJ. On April 6, 1989, 
Morgan was ordered to report to Parris Island. 
 
Puleo was initially unable to interview Lockwood, the 
recruit who had first implicated Morgan in the scheme to 
falsify diplomas. However, Puleo finally was able to 
interview Lockwood after the Article 32 hearing, and 
Lockwood told him that he had lied to the investigating 
team. Lockwood said that Master Sergeant Cawman, a 
member of the Evans investigating team, told him that he 
(Lockwood) would have to implicate Morgan and Cawman 
told him what to say. 
 
Based on Lockwood's allegations, Puleo preferred charges 
against Cawman.15 Puleo gave the charge sheet to Koleos to 
be forwarded to the Commanding General. Koleos later told 
Puleo that the charge sheet had been sent through 
channels, but Puleo subsequently found it in a waste 
basket. Cawman was never prosecuted. 
 
As these disclosures were occurring, General Lynch was 
reviewing Healey's recommendation that Morgan receive 
only an NJP. However, Lynch rejected that recommendation 
and ordered yet another investigation. Consequently, the 
Article 32 hearing was reopened. Staff Sergeant Cummings 
testified for the government at the reopened hearing under 
a grant of immunity. As a result, new charges were brought 
against Morgan and a new charge sheet was prepared that 
contained the original charges plus two new ones.16 One of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Anyone subject to the UCMJ may serve as an "accuser" and prefer 
charges against someone else. 10 U.S.C. S 801(9). 
 
16. Under Article 32, the investigating officer may, subject to certain 
conditions, investigate other, uncharged offenses, if the evidence 
indicates that the accused may have committed those offenses. 10 
U.S.C. S 832(d). 
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the new charges was an allegation that Morgan was 
engaging in an illegal bookmaking operation in RS 
Pittsburgh. 
 
Following that reopened investigation, Major Healy 
prepared another report in which she noted that Cummings 
testified under a grant of immunity, that he had previously 
lied, and that he admitted to using cocaine while on 
recruiting duty. Healey also noted that the government 
called witnesses who negated Cummings' testimony against 
Morgan. Nonetheless, she recommended that Morgan be 
tried by general court-martial.17 
 
H. 
 
Morgan's general court-martial18 was scheduled for 
Tuesday, August 8, 1989, in Parris Island. However, one 
week before the scheduled trial, Koleos19  suggested to Puleo 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. After Healey filed her second report, Morgan wrote to then 
Pennsylvania Senator John Heinz and complained about the conduct of 
the government, and the charges brought against him. That letter formed 
the substance of Morgan's "whistleblower" claim. However, the district 
court found that General Lynch did not know of the letter and that no 
action was taken against Morgan because of it. Thatfinding of fact is not 
clearly erroneous. 
 
18. A general court-martial is the highest trial court in military law. 
Article 16 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. S 816. Articles 22 through 29 of the 
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. SS 822-29, establish the mechanics of convening a 
court-martial and the composition of its members. For a detailed 
discussion of the entire process, see SCHLUETER , supra note 9, SS 8-1 
through 8-6. 
 
19. Koleos had by this time been assigned to be the prosecutor for 
Morgan's general court-martial. In military jurisprudence, the prosecutor 
is called "trial counsel." HOMER E. MOYER, JR., JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY, 
S 2-306; 10 U.S.C. S 827(a)(1). 
 
Koleos occupied a number of positions in this case. He was the Deputy 
Staff Judge Advocate for the Eastern Recruiting Region and the legal 
advisor to the Evans' investigation. At the request of Major Kelley, legal 
advisor to the Casey investigation, he interviewed Jerry Williams, the 
printer accused of printing false high school diplomas for applicants. 
Further, he was government counsel in Morgan's Article 32 investigation 
conducted by Major Healey. 
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that Morgan should opt for an Other Than Honorable 
("OTH") discharge in lieu of a general court-martial.20 Puleo 
declined the offer on behalf of his client. Koleos then asked 
Puleo if his position would be different if the government 
had a notebook in which Morgan had recorded his 
bookmaking. Cummings had allegedly taken this "gray 
book" from Morgan's car, and Koleos purportedly allowed 
Cummings to travel to Pittsburgh to retrieve it. 
 
Later that week, on Thursday or Friday, Koleos told Puleo 
that Cummings was bringing the gray book to Parris Island 
for Morgan's court-martial. On Saturday, August 5, Koleos 
again told Puleo that Cummings had the gray book; but 
claimed that he did not know where Cummings was. That 
afternoon, Puleo went to Koleos' office. Koleos happened to 
be speaking to Cummings on the telephone when Puleo 
arrived, and Puleo told Koleos he wanted to speak with 
Cummings. However, as soon as Koleos finished his 
conversation he hung up the phone. Koleos told Puleo that 
Cummings was on his way to Parris Island with the gray 
book and that the offer to allow Morgan to take the OTH 
discharge was only open until Cummings and the gray 
book arrived at Parris Island. 
 
On Monday morning, August 7, 1989, Puleo spoke to 
Koleos again about the gray book and Koleos indicated that 
Cummings had the gray book. Based on Koleos' 
representations about the gray book, Morgan decided to 
accept the government's offer of an OTH discharge in lieu of 
trial by general court-martial. Accordingly, Morgan 
submitted a request for administrative discharge under 
other than honorable conditions in lieu of a general court- 
martial. In the request, which he prepared with defense 
counsel Puleo, Morgan pleaded guilty to wrongfully 
participating in gambling activity while on duty as the 
Recruiting Instructor -- the least serious offense that 
Morgan had been charged with. General Lynch approved 
the request the same day. Consequently, Morgan was 
administratively reduced in rank to lance corporal with a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The regulations of the various armed services permit an enlisted 
accused to apply for an administrative discharge rather than face a trial 
by court-martial. SCHLUETER, supra note 9, S 9-4. 
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corresponding reduction in pay, and he became ineligible to 
serve in the Marine Corps Reserve. 
 
However, after the request for the OTH discharge was 
approved, Cummings informed Puleo that he did not have 
the gray book, that he never did have it, and that he had 
been in constant touch with Koleos the previous weekend. 
Cummings told Puleo that he had only stated that he was 
looking for the gray book, and denied ever telling Koleos 
that he actually had it. Cummings also told Puleo that 
Koleos had promised him a general discharge in exchange 
for his testimony against Morgan. 
 
Thereupon, Puleo filed a motion to dismiss the charges 
against Morgan based on prosecutorial and governmental 
misconduct. Puleo based the motion upon the numerous 
attempts to falsely implicate Morgan by named Marines, 
including Koleos, and members of the Evans' investigation 
team, and the evidence of coercion and perjury that were 
part of that alleged scheme. However, the request to 
dismiss the charges against Morgan was denied. 
 
Puleo also prepared a request for Morgan to withdraw his 
OTH discharge and that was submitted to General Lynch 
on April 9, 1989. The request was based on Morgan's prior 
reliance on the government's representations that it had the 
gray book in its possession, and his subsequent discovery 
that the government could not produce that evidence. If 
Morgan's request had been granted, his trial by general 
court-martial would have proceeded.21 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Under military criminal procedure, an accused must be tried within 
120 days of the date the charges are preferred, pretrial restraint in the 
form of confinement, arrest or restriction in lieu of arrest or the 
accused 
is brought on active duty. R.C.M. 707(a)(1), (2), (3). In Morgan's case, 
the 
last day of his "speedy trial" time was August 8, 1989, the date of his 
scheduled trial. Puleo testified that he expected that Morgan's request to 
withdraw the OTH discharge would be treated as a defense delay, which 
would toll the speedy trial clock. R.C.M. 707(c). However, there is no 
indication that Morgan was willing to waive his speedy trial rights. 
Furthermore, the filing of the request would not by itself have stopped 
the clock from running. R.C.M. 707(c)(1) and Discussion. By August 9, 
1989, Morgan's speedy trial time would have expired. 
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After Morgan submitted his request to withdraw the OTH 
discharge, the Staff Judge Advocate, Colonel Jones, 
interviewed Koleos and Puleo. On August 9, 1989, Jones 
sent a memo to General Lynch, recommending disapproval 
of Morgan's request. The memo states in part: 
 
       3. The evidence in question, a grey book consistin g of 
       memorandum records of respondent's gambling 
       transactions with customers, was never in the 
       possession of government counsel nor was it ever 
       represented to be so. The government counsel 
       indicated to respondent's counsel that a government 
       witness had taken the book from the respondent's 
       vehicle in December, 1988, claimed that he possessed 
       it, and was making efforts to bring it under the control 
       and custody of the government counsel by the close of 
       business of August 7, 1989. 
 
       4. Whether or not the representations of governmen t 
       counsel were the causal factor in the submission of the 
       request is speculative at best. It should be noted 
       however, that the respondent did not indicate in his 
       request for separation that he considered the book to 
       be the dispositive factor in his decision to avoid trial by 
       court-martial. Furthermore, the government was not 
       relying upon its production to obtain a conviction but 
       rather the testimony of six witnesses and other 
       corroborative documentary evidence. 
 
On August 9, 1898, General Lynch denied Morgan's request 
to withdraw the OTH discharge. He offered no explanation 
for doing so. That same day, General Lynch dismissed the 
charges against Morgan in light of the OTH discharge. On 
August 31, 1989, Morgan was discharged from the Marine 
Corps on an "other than honorable" basis. 22 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Following his discharge, Morgan sent a letter to Congressman 
Murtha complaining of his treatment. Morgan subsequently argued 
before the district court that his Constitutional rights were violated 
because the Marines retaliated against him for writing that letter. 
However, the district court properly rejected that argument as the letter 
was written after he had been discharged from the Marine Corps, and 
could not, therefore, have been the basis for any retaliation. 
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II. 
 
In 1991, Morgan filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
seeking declaratory and equitable relief against the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Commanding 
General of Parris Island. The six counts of the Complaint 
alleged violations of the Constitution, including violations of 
free speech, cruel and unusual punishment,23 equal 
protection and due process. The court rejected all but one 
of Morgan's claims24 after a nonjury trial. The court did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Morgan did not pursue his eighth amendment claim at trial. 
 
24. The following is a synopsis of each claim and of the district court's 
holding on each. 
 
1. First Amendment Claim. -- Morgan claims he was a 
"whistleblower" who was retaliated against for blowing the whistle on 
recruiting fraud. However, the district court rejected this claim because 
it found the testimony of General Lynch credible. Thus, Lynch ordered 
Colonel Casey, to investigate and fix the RS Pittsburgh problem. Lynch 
testified that he did not know Morgan; that he was never informed that 
Morgan had complained about the problems in RS Pittsburgh to Master 
Sergeant Zuro; and that his investigation was not the result of any 
"whistleblowing" by Morgan. District Court Opinion, Conclusions of Law 
P 52. 
 
2. Sixth Amendment right to counsel claim.-- Morgan claimed that 
he was mislead by Captain Evans into believing that Evans was an 
attorney and thus, his right to counsel was violated. Captain Evans 
indicated that he was a legal advisor and Morgan talked to Captain 
Evans for about 30 to 45 minutes. However, Captain Evans is not an 
attorney. 
 
The district court rejected this claim by holding that Morgan failed to 
establish that he sustained any harm as a result of Evan's 
misrepresentation. Id. at P 53. 
 
3. Claim under the Equal Protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment. -- Morgan claims that gambling is tolerated in the Marine 
Corps and, by preferring gambling charges against him, the government 
was engaging in selective prosecution. The district court rejected this 
selective prosecution claim by finding that, although gambling in the 
form of football pools, raffle tickets and the Pennsylvania Lottery took 
place in RS Pittsburgh, Morgan was not being prosecuted for this type of 
gambling. Rather, Morgan was being prosecuted for running a 
bookmaking operation at RS Pittsburgh. Id. at P 54. 
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discuss Morgan's claim that his right to substantive due 
process had been violated, but it did conclude that Koleos' 
conduct "during the week preceding [Morgan's] scheduled 
trial by general court-martial. . . ." had denied Morgan's 
right to due process of the law. Dist. Ct. Op. atP 55. The 
court wrote: 
 
       Specifically, the court finds that Captain Koleos 
       engaged in deceptive conduct in connection with the 
       availability of Staff Sergeant Cummings and the 
       availability of the government to gain possession of the 
       gray book. The court further finds that such deception 
       was improper, and that it was the determining factor in 
       [Morgan's] decision to request an OTH discharge in lieu 
       of trial by general court-martial, violating his right for 
       an opportunity to be heard on the charges against him. 
       Accordingly, [Morgan] is entitled to a declaratory 
       judgment that defendants violated his right to 
       procedural due process of law under the Fifth 
       Amendment. 
 
Id. The court also noted other allegations of misconduct 
alleged against Koleos and others, including the alleged 
attempts to falsely accuse Morgan of procuring fraudulent 
diplomas. However, the court was "unpersuaded that these 
incidents of misconduct were factors in [Morgan's] decision 
to request the OTH discharge. . . ." Thus, the district court 
"decline[d] to find that such misconduct also violated 
[Morgan's] Fifth Amendment right to due process." Id. at 
P 55 n.62. 
 
Despite ruling in Morgan's favor on his procedural due 
process claim, the court concluded that it could give only 
limited relief. The court determined that it is"impracticable 
to vacate General Lynch's August 9, 1989 decision, which 
denied [Morgan's] request to withdraw his request for an 
OTH discharge, and to order the Marine Corps to proceed 
with [Morgan's] trial by general court-martial," as he had 
requested. Id. at P 56, The court also rejected Morgan's 
request for reinstatement in the Corps. "[I]t is undisputed 
that there is no vested property right in future reenlistment 
in the Marine Corps." Id.. The court reasoned that the 
Marines would not have permitted Morgan to reenlist upon 
the expiration of his last reenlistment period on February 5, 
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1990. Thus, the district court directed the Marines to 
reinstate Morgan for the limited period of time between 
August 31, 1989, the date of his OTH discharge, and 
February 5, 1990, the date of the expiration of his last 
reenlistment. Id. The Marine Corps was also directed to 
expunge Morgan's military records insofar as they reflected 
a reduction in rank and the OTH discharge, to restore him 
to his status as a Master Sergeant, and to recharacterize 
his discharge as honorable or general using the standards 
applicable to those discharged at the expiration of their 
normal term of service. Finally, the district court denied 
Morgan's claim for back pay under Hubbard v. 
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, 982 F.2d 
531 (D.C.Cir. 1991), which held "that the waiver of 
sovereign immunity in Section 702 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act for `relief other than money damages' does 
not waive sovereign immunity for an award of backpay." Id. 
 
III. 
 
Morgan did not appeal the district court's merits 
decision. However, on September 28, 1995, he filed an 
application to the district court for an award of attorney's 
fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act EAJA. 
Under the EAJA, a prevailing party25 in non-tort litigation 
against the United States is entitled to attorney's fees and 
costs, unless the court finds that the position taken by the 
government "was substantially justified or that special 
circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2412(D)(1)(A). In a Memorandum and Order, dated May 3, 
1996, the district court found that the government's 
position was substantially justified and, denied Morgan's 
application for attorney's fees and costs. This appeal 
followed. 
 
IV. 
 
The district court's determination of substantial 
justification in a suit under the EAJA is reviewed for abuse 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. The government concedes that Morgan is the prevailing party for 
purposes of the EAJA. 
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of discretion. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 
(1988). An abuse of discretion arises when the district 
court's decision "rests upon a clearly erroneousfinding of 
fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application 
of law to fact." Hanover Potato Products, Inc. v. Shalala, 989 
F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993). An abuse of discretion can 
also occur "when no reasonable person would adopt the 
district court's view." Id. Therefore, we will not interfere 
with the district court's exercise of discretion"unless there 
is a definite and firm conviction that the court. . . 
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it 
reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Id. 
Finally, as a part of our abuse of discretion review, we 
examine the district court's factual findings for clear error. 
Id. Our task in this regard is more difficult because the 
factual underpinnings of the EAJA claim are not set forth 
in the district court's opinion denying fees and costs, but in 
its decision on the merits. There, the district court notes 
the numerous instances of conflicting testimony but makes 
very few findings of fact or credibility determinations. 
Although our task is thus complicated, the issue before us 
is sufficiently narrow that we can proceed with our analysis 
based upon our review of the record and the findings that 
the district court made along with those that are implicit in 
that court's decision. 
 
V. 
 
Although our inquiry must be controlled by the language 
of the statute in question, our analysis is aided by the 
Supreme Court's statement of the policy underlying the 
EAJA: 
 
       Concerned that the Government, with its vast 
       resources, could force citizens into acquiescing to 
       adverse Government action, rather than vindicating 
       their rights, simply by threatening them with costly 
       litigation, Congress enacted the EAJA, waiving the 
       United States' sovereign and general statutory 
       immunity to fee awards and creating a limited 
       exception to the `American Rule' against awarding 
       attorneys fees to prevailing parties. 
 
                                24 
  
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 575 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The 
section of the EAJA applicable here26 provides as follows: 
 
       Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a 
       court shall award to a prevailing party other than the 
       United States fees and other expenses, in addition to 
       any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred 
       by that party in any civil action (other than cases 
       sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial 
       review of agency action, brought by or against the 
       United States in any court having jurisdiction of that 
       action, unless the court finds that the position of the 
       United States was substantially justified or that special 
       circumstances make an award unjust. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1)(A). "Fees" include "reasonable 
attorney fees." 28 U.S.C. S 2412 (d)(2)(A). The question of 
whether the position of the United States was "substantially 
justified shall be determined on the basis of the record 
(including the record with respect to the action or failure to 
act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Morgan argues that his fee application can also be considered under 
section 2412(b) of the EAJA which provides: 
 
       Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award 
       reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs 
       which may be awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing 
       parties in any civil action brought by or against the United States 
or 
       any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or 
her 
       official capacity in any Court having jurisdiction of such action. 
The 
       United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the 
       extent that any other party would be liable under the common law 
       or the terms of any statute which would specifically provide for 
such 
       an award. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2412(b). This section of the EAJA does not relieve the 
government of liability for attorney's fees to the prevailing party even 
in 
a case where the government's position was substantially justified. 
However, it does require that the prevailing party identify some other 
statute or rule of common law which specifically provides for an award 
of attorney's fees. Morgan has not identified any such statute or rule of 
common law and, therefore, his argument that a fee award can be made 
under 2412(b) is without merit. 
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which is made in the civil action for which fees and other 
expenses are sought." 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1)(B). 
 
The Supreme Court has defined substantial justification 
under the EAJA as "justified in substance or in the main -- 
that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable 
person." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 565. That is to 
say, the government's position is substantially justified "if it 
has a reasonable basis in both law and fact." Hanover 
Potato Products, Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d at 128. The 
government has the burden of establishing that there is 
substantial justification for its position. Id. at 128. In order 
to do so, the government must show: (1) a reasonable basis 
in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law 
for the theory it propounded; and (3) a reasonable 
connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory 
advanced. Id. 
 
The government's position under the EAJA includes "not 
only the position taken in the litigation but the agency 
position that made the litigation necessary in thefirst 
place." Id. Thus, unless the government's pre-litigation and 
litigation positions have a reasonable basis in both law and 
fact, the government's position is not substantially justified. 
Id.; see also Taylor v. Heckler, 835 F.2d 1037, 1040 (3d Cir. 
1988) ("[T]he government is deemed to have two positions 
for EAJA purposes, both [of which] must be substantially 
justified. . . . [I]f either government position does not bear 
scrutiny, the prevailing party should be awarded attorneys' 
fees [and other reasonable fees and expenses]."). 
 
VI. 
 
In denying Morgan's fee application, the district court 
noted that Morgan raised six claims against the defendants 
alleging violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and that the relief Morgan sought 
was (1) a declaration that the constitutional rights 
guaranteed under those provisions were violated; (2) an 
injunction providing for his reinstatement into the Marine 
Corps, with restitution of all financial losses and other 
benefits and the expungement of his record of his OTH 
discharge; (3) costs, expenses and attorneys fees; and (4) 
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other just and equitable relief. Dist. Ct. EAJA Opn. at 3. 
The district court then noted that Morgan prevailed on only 
one of his claims, i.e., that Koleos' conduct during the week 
preceding the scheduled court-martial violated his Fifth 
Amendment procedural due process rights, and failed to 
prove any of his other constitutional claims. Thus, "the 
relief awarded to plaintiff was very limited in relation to the 
requested relief." Id. at 12. 
 
We must emphasize, however, that the limited nature of 
the relief fashioned by the district court does not in anyway 
obscure the seriousness of even the single instance of 
misconduct that the court found. Koleos was appointed to 
prosecute this matter for the Marine Corps. He conducted 
himself in a manner that violated rights afforded under the 
very constitution he had sworn to uphold as an attorney 
and as an officer in the Marine Corps. 
 
The ABA Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and 
Defense Function, are applicable to Marine Corps judge 
advocates. United States v. Pack, 9 M.J. 752, 754 (C.M.A. 
1980). Rule 4.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
requires that a lawyer "shall not knowingly . . . make a 
false statement of material fact . . . to a third person." 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1. A "third 
person" within the meaning of the rule includes opposing 
counsel. Id., Legal Background. Criminal Justice Standard 
3-4.1 provides that it is "unprofessional conduct for a 
prosecutor knowingly to make false statements or 
representations in the course of plea discussions with 
defense counsel or the accused." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-4.1. 
Accordingly, Koleos' fabrications about the gray book 
constituted a gross ethical violation of his duty and 
responsibility as a lawyer as well as government prosecutor. 
Koleos' conduct is also "conduct unbecoming an officer and 
a gentleman" which is prohibited by Article 133 of the 
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. S 933.27 The military demands that its 
officers comport themselves in accordance with a strict 
moral standard, a deviation from which can be a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). 
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punishable offense under the UCMJ. See M.C.M., Part IV, 
P 59(c)(2). Counsel for the government in this appeal deems 
it advantageous to dwell upon Morgan's limited victory in 
its attempt to defeat his petition for fees under the EJAJ. 
However, Koleos' utter disregard for his duties and 
responsibilities as an attorney and as a commissioned 
officer, coupled with his contempt for the constitutional 
rights of Master Sergeant Morgan, affords the government 
little room to trumpet the limited scope of Morgan's victory. 
We are thus guided not by Koleos' misconduct, but by the 
extent to which the government's position in defending 
itself against Morgan's claim was substantially justified. 
 
VII. 
 
"[D]etermining whether the government's position is 
substantially justified for the resolution of an EAJA claim 
has proved to be an issue of considerable conceptual and 
practical difficulty." Roanoake River Basin Association v. 
Hudson, 991 F.2d 132, 138 (4th Cir. 1993). We cannot 
assume that the government must pay Morgan's attorney's 
fees merely because it did not successfully defend against 
Morgan's suit on the merits in its entirety. The EAJA is not 
a "loser pays" statute.28 Thus, a court cannot assume that 
the government's position was not substantially justified 
simply because the government lost on the merits. "[T]he 
inquiry into reasonableness for EAJA purposes may not be 
collapsed into [the] antecedent evaluation of the merits, for 
EAJA sets forth a distinct legal standard." Cooper v. United 
States Railroad Retirement Board, 24 F.3d 1414, 1416 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). Furthermore, as previously noted, we must 
scrutinize both the government's prelitigation position and 
its litigation position. Both positions must be substantially 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. It has been argued persuasively, however, that where the government 
acts in bad faith or acts dishonestly, the government's conduct 
"undermines the `substantial justification' for the government's position" 
and an award of attorney's fees should follow. Gregory C. Fisk, The 
Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney's 
Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two) , 56 La. L. R. 1, 54 
(1995). Fee-shifting in such a case is " `automatic' only in the circular 
sense that fee-shifting occurs automatically when the government acts 
unreasonably." Id. at 41. 
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justified and if either is not, attorney's fees should be 
awarded to the prevailing party. 
 
A. 
 
The usual conceptual difficulties inherent in resolving an 
EAJA claim are further complicated here because Morgan 
and the government have a fundamental disagreement over 
what the district court should have examined in 
determining whether the government's prelitigation position 
was substantially justified. Morgan argues that because he 
alleged a number of constitutional claims involving a 
number of military personnel, the district court"should 
have taken a broader view and consider[ed] not only 
General Lynch's decision, and subjective knowledge, but 
also that of his advisors and other government agents, 
especially the actions and intent of Captain Koleos, 
Morgan's Marine Corps prosecutor." Reply Br. at 2. Morgan 
would have us revisit his merits claim and consider 
whether General Lynch's decision was reasonable in light of 
all of the constitutional violations Morgan alleged in his 
complaint, including allegations of misconduct during the 
Evans' investigation, allegations against Cawman and 
allegations about the fabrication of William's statement. See 
Appellant's Br. at 23-34. In essence, Morgan argues that 
the district court ignored the numerous constitutional 
violations which caused him to file his civil action by 
limiting the focus of the EAJA inquiry to the 
reasonableness of General Lynch's decision, which only 
addressed Koleos' fabrications about the gray book. 
 
Not unexpectedly, the government urges us to focus only 
upon General Lynch's reasons for refusing to allow Morgan 
to withdraw his request for the OTH discharge in lieu of 
court-martial. The government argues that we cannot look 
beyond Lynch's refusal and examine every instance of 
misconduct alleged by Morgan. 
 
Although we have detailed some (though by no means all) 
of the allegations surrounding the Marine Corps 
investigation into recruiting fraud in RS Pittsburgh, the 
deceit purportedly perpetrated by Marine Corps personnel, 
and by Morgan himself, we do not suggest that this 
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backdrop controls our substantial justification analysis. 
Rather, as noted above, we state it only because it is 
impossible to understand Morgan's EJAJ petition in a 
vacuum. 
 
The Marine Corps' investigation of Morgan had two parts. 
One involved recruiting fraud and one involved bookmaking 
charges. Koleos' misconduct in regard to the gray book, 
which the district court found was the decisive factor in 
Morgan's decision to opt for the OTH discharge, 29 has 
nothing to do with the recruiting fraud charges leveled 
against Morgan. In fact, Morgan was willing to be tried by 
the general court-martial until Koleos lead him to believe 
that the government had solid proof of Morgan's gambling 
activities in the form of the gray book. Once Morgan was 
informed that the government had his gray book, he 
requested an OTH discharge. And once he learned that 
Koleos did not have the gray book, he immediately 
attempted to withdraw that request. Further, Morgan did 
not plead guilty to any charge that arose from the 
recruiting fraud investigations. He did plead guilty to 
charges of bookmaking. Thus, we can not allow the 
government's conduct during the recruiting fraud 
investigations to guide our analysis of its position with 
regard to Morgan's requested discharge or his attempt to 
withdraw the request.30 
 
Morgan also insists that Koleos' misconduct is relevant to 
determining substantial justification even if we focus solely 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. Koleos also engaged in misconduct in the recruiting fraud aspect of 
the case when he misstated the results of his conversation with 
Williams, the printer, about Morgan's complicity in the scheme involving 
the preparation of false high school diplomas. However, the district court 
found that Koleos"s misconduct in regard to the Williams conversation 
was not relevant to Morgan's request for an OTH discharge. Dist. Ct. 
Opn. at P 55 n.62. 
 
30. For a discussion of the extent to which the EAJA inquiry focuses 
only upon the narrow issue on which a party prevailed or upon the 
entire litigation of which that issue may have been only a small part, see 
Ronoake River Basin Associates v. Hudson et al. 991 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 
1993). There, the narrow issue that the prevailing party relied upon for 
its fee request under the EAJA had a much closer nexus to the 
government's overall action than the challenged action here. 
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upon Lynch's refusal to allow Morgan to withdraw his 
requested discharge. We disagree. Although we in no way 
minimize the gravity or impropriety of Koleos' conduct, it is 
clear to us that Koleos' conduct is not the issue before us. 
Rather, the issue is General Lynch's refusal to allow 
Morgan to withdraw his request of an OTH discharge and 
proceed to a general court martial. The fact that Morgan's 
request was triggered by Koleos' conduct does not elevate 
that conduct to the level of agency action under the facts 
before us nor transform his conduct into the decision that 
was challenged in court.31 Morgan challenged General 
Lynch's decision, and that is the agency action that must 
be substantially justified32 if Morgan is to be denied fees 
under the EAJA even though Koleos' conduct formed the 
basis of Morgan's relief in the district court. Therefore, the 
district court's exclusive focus on the reasonableness of 
General Lynch's decision was proper.33  After reviewing this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. We need not determine under what circumstances the unlawful 
actions or misconduct of an agency employee who is not responsible for 
the challenged action can amount to agency action for purposes of an 
EAJA fee petition. It has been held that, as general rule, an agency 
employee's unauthorized conduct, which is not subject to judicial review, 
cannot be regarded as agency action. Chiu v. United States, 948 F.2d 
711, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1991). However, where the agency acts based upon 
the misconduct of its employee, agency action can be found. Id. 
(supervisory employee's unlawful motivation in recommending 
elimination of plaintiff 's government position was deemed agency action 
where the agency official implementing the reduction-in-force decision 
acted on supervisor's recommendation). 
 
32. In opposing Morgan's fee application in the district court, the 
government argued not only that its position was substantially justified 
but also that special circumstances made a fee award unjust. However, 
the district court did not address the government's special 
circumstances argument because it found that the government's position 
was substantially justified. Dist. Ct. EAJA Op. at 5 n.3. In this appeal, 
the government is not arguing that special circumstances make a fee 
award unjust. 
 
33. Had Lynch allowed Morgan to withdraw his OTH request, Morgan 
would have faced a general court martial where he could have raised all 
of the constitutional claims he litigated in the district court. Military 
tribunals have the same responsibilities to protect a person from 
constitutional violations as do federal courts. In re Kelly, 401 F.2d 211 
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record, we cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion in finding that the government's prelitigation 
position (General Lynch's refusal to allow Morgan to 
withdraw his request for an OTH) was substantially 
justified. 
 
The district court believed that General Lynch's reliance 
on Colonel Jones' recommendation was reasonable. 
Admittedly, Jones' report appears to contain a factual error. 
Jones wrote that "[w]hether or not the representations of 
government counsel were the causal factor in the 
submission of the request is speculative at best." Supp. 
App. at 33. However, it is obvious that Koleos' 
representations did cause Morgan to request discharge just 
as the district court concluded. 
 
However, the district court's finding about Morgan's 
reasons for seeking to withdraw his request for the OTH 
discharge does not mean that either Jones or Lynch had to 
accept Morgan's explanation. Jones made his own 
credibility determination and Lynch relied on it. The fact 
that the district court made a different determination does 
not make Lynch's reliance on Jones' report unreasonable. 
 
While General Lynch did not give any reason for denying 
Morgan's request, his testimony at trial suggests that his 
primary concern was avoiding the expense and 
inconvenience of flying witnesses to Parris Island for a 
court martial. 
 
       When he first brought [the request for OTH discharge] 
       in, . . . I was disinclined to approve it. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(5th Cir. 1968). Simply stated, if Lynch had allowed Morgan to withdraw 
his OTH request, there would have been no district court litigation and 
no consequent EAJA fee application. 
 
Further, Lynch's decision, made in his capacity as the Commanding 
General of the MCRD, Parris Island, is the agency action we are 
examining here. The Marine Corps is within the Department of the Navy, 
Neal v. Secretary of the Navy, 639 F.2d 1029, 1033 n.4 (3d Cir. 1981, 
and each branch of the military is an agency within the meaning of the 
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. S 551 et seq. See Id. at 1036 
and Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 719 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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* * * 
 
       Because I thought that justice would be better served 
       if Master Sergeant Morgan stood trial by court-martial, 
       . . . 
 
        And the point was made in general terms that if it 
       went to court-martial, it would be a great expense to 
       the government, we would probably have to bring 
       witnesses in on a worldwide basis, and whatever, and 
       we were serving the needs or requirements of justice 
       just as well by acceding to Master Sergeant Morgan's 
       request. 
 
        Having been convinced on that score, I then 
       approved the request. 
 
App. at 38. General Lynch also explained that he did not 
allow Morgan to withdraw the OTH once it was granted 
because "nothing had changed, nothing that is in terms of 
what had prompted the initial decision to accept his 
request had changed. There was discussion on this book, 
this gambling book." App. at 40. Lynch added:"Any 
decision to do anything other than continue on the course, 
we were going, would have had to have been influenced by 
a change in circumstances and there was no change." App. 
at 41. 
 
We must disagree that "nothing had changed." Morgan 
had learned that the government did not have his gray 
book, and apparently believed that the Corps' case against 
him was seriously compromised without it. Furthermore, 
when Morgan sought to withdraw his request for the OTH 
discharge, Lynch knew that Koleos had been accused of 
misconduct and he knew that the government did not have 
the gray book in its possession. App. at 40, 105. However, 
Lynch's erroneous belief that "nothing had changed" does 
not compel a finding that denial of Morgan's request was 
without substantial justification. The government's 
"position can be justified even though it is not correct." 
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 566 n.2. 
 
When Morgan sought to withdraw his request for the 
OTH discharge and proceed to trial by general court 
martial, he never recanted his admission of guilt. He never 
 
                                33 
  
claimed that he was innocent of the gambling charge. 34 
Morgan had the benefit of defense counsel when he made 
the admission in his request for an OTH discharge. 
Moreover, the wording of his request to withdraw his OTH 
discharge reaffirms that evidence existed that would prove 
that he was guilty of the gambling offense to which he had 
pleaded guilty. When Morgan learned that the government 
did not have the gray book, he decided that he wanted to 
force the Marine Corps to conduct a general court-martial 
to determine the truth of the gambling charge as well as the 
other charges against him. He was willing to risk that the 
government could not prove the gambling charge without 
the gray book, and the other charges against him were 
based in large part upon testimony that had since been 
recanted, and witnesses who were either biased, or who 
were willing to testify that they had been coerced into 
falsely accusing him of various recruiting irregularities. 
 
Since Morgan never sought to withdraw his admission of 
guilt, Lynch's belief that the ends of justice would be served 
by simply accepting the still pending admission of guilt and 
giving Morgan the OTH discharge that he requested a day 
earlier was eminently reasonable. Accordingly, the district 
court's finding that the government's prelitigation position 
was substantially justified was not an abuse of discretion.35 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. Although Morgan claimed that the gray book never existed, that 
claim is not credible. See Dist. Ct. EAJA Opn. at 11 n.5. Had there been 
no gray book, Morgan would not have been persuaded to request the 
OTH discharge when Puleo told him of Koleos' representation that the 
government had such a book. 
 
35. We also note that Morgan's request to rescind his requested OTH was 
submitted to General Lynch on August 8, 1989. Under the UCMJ, the 
military had 120 days to bring Morgan to court martial. See note 21 
supra. August 8th was the last possible day that he could have been 
tried consistent with that limitation. Although Captain Puleo testified 
that he assumed that the request to withdraw the OTH discharge and 
proceed to court martial would act as a waiver of Morgan's "speedy trial" 
rights, Morgan did not waive those rights in the request he submitted on 
August 9. However, since General Lynch was apparently unaware of this 
possible legal hurdle, it is not a factor in our analysis. 
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B. 
 
Morgan argues that the government's repeated attacks on 
the jurisdiction of the district court in his merits suit 
demonstrate the complete lack of justification for the 
government's litigation position. We disagree. The 
government argued that Morgan's complaint failed to assert 
any waiver of its sovereign immunity. Absent such waiver, 
Morgan could not bring an action against his superior 
officers. 
 
In its EAJA opinion, district court indicated that its 
jurisdiction to hear Morgan's claims was "far from clear and 
presented a close question of law" and noted that the 
jurisdictional issue presented a "substantial question of 
law." Dist. Ct. EAJA Opn. at 6 and n.4. Further, the district 
court noted that "government counsel would have been 
remiss in not strenuously pursuing its argument that[the] 
court lacked jurisdiction to hear [Morgan's] claims." Id. at 6 
n.4. 
 
Ultimately, that court held that it had jurisdiction over 
Morgan's claims under Section 702 of the Administrative 
Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. S 702. 36 See Jaffee v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. Section 702 of the APA provides as follows: 
 
       A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
       adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning 
       of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An 
action 
       in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money 
       damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or 
       employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or 
       under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief 
       therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United 
States 
       or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United 
       States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a 
       judgment or decree may be entered against the United States: 
       Provided, That any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the 
       Federal officer or officers (by name or by title), and their 
successors 
       in office, personally responsible for compliance. Nothing herein 
(1) 
       affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty 
of 
       the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other 
       appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to 
       grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit 
expressly 
       or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought. 
 
5 U.S.C. S 702. 
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United States, 592 F.2d 712, 719 (3d Cir. 1979). However, 
in its EAJA opinion the district court expressly noted that 
Morgan "exacerbated the jurisdictional controversy by 
failing to allege the appropriate waiver of sovereign 
immunity under the APA" in his complaint or subsequent 
filings and that Morgan "specifically disregarded the court's 
specific instruction to file an amended complaint alleging 
the appropriate waiver of sovereign immunity under the 
APA." EAJA Op. at 6. 
 
Even if we disagreed with the district court's assessment 
of the difficulty of the jurisdictional issue, we cannot 
conclude that the government's actions in challenging 
jurisdiction were unreasonable, especially in light of 
Morgan's failure to plead a waiver of sovereign immunity. 
Moreover, although Morgan argues that jurisdiction was 
clear from the very beginning and that the challenges to 
jurisdiction were therefore unreasonable, he was given an 
opportunity to clarify any jurisdictional uncertainty when 
the district court instructed him to amend his complaint to 
plead waiver under the APA. Consequently, we believe that 
the government's litigation position was substantially 
justified. 
 
VIII. 
 
Our holding that the government's position in the 
underlying litigation was substantially justified and that the 
denial of attorney's fees was appropriate does not end our 
inquiry. Morgan argues that he is entitled to costs under 
the EAJA even if he is not entitled to attorney's fees, and in 
support of that argument he relies on Section 2412(a)(1) of 
the EAJA which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
       Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a 
       judgment for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of 
       this title, but not including the fees and expenses of 
       attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party in 
       any civil action brought by or against the United States 
       or any agency or any official of the United States acting 
       in his or her official capacity in any court having 
       jurisdiction of such action. 
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28 U.S.C. S 2412(a)(1). He notes that, unlikeS 2412(d)(1)(A), 
which requires a finding that the government's position was 
not substantially justified before a district court can award 
attorney's fees, S 2412(a)(1) does not require such a finding 
as a condition to the award of costs. Thus, he argues that 
because he was the prevailing party, he is entitled to costs 
without regard to the reasonableness of the government's 
position in defending against his claims. 
 
However, we do not believe it necessary to reach the 
merits of Morgan's argument. Section 2412(a)(1) specifically 
refers to costs as enumerated in 28 U.S.C. S 1920, which 
provides as follows: 
 
       A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may 
       tax as costs the following: 
 
       (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; 
       (2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the 
       stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in 
       the case; 
       (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; 
       (4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers 
       necessarily obtained for use in the case; 
       (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; 
       (6) Compensation of court appointed experts, 
       compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, 
       expenses, and costs of special interpretation services 
       under section 1828 of this title. 
 
       A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon 
       allowance, included in the judgment or decree. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1920 (emphasis added). It is clear that such 
costs are an incident of judgment. Rude v. Buchhalter, 286 
U.S. 451, 459 (1931); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 54. 
 
Morgan inserted a prayer for costs in his complaint, but 
the district court did not address it in its merits disposition. 
See App. at 410-11. The award or non-award of costs is 
inherent to, and appealable from, the initial judgment. See 
Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 569 F.2d 1294 
(4th Cir. 1978). However, Morgan did not appeal from any 
part of the district court's merits decision. Consequently, 
his failure to appeal from the district court's failure to 
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award costs makes that aspect of the judgment afinal 
decision which Morgan cannot now attack. Id. at 1297. 
 
IX. 
 
In closing, we wish to reiterate that although we affirm 
the denial of relief to Morgan under the EJAJ, we do not 
intend to minimize the seriousness of the misconduct that 
has been attributed to Captain Koleos, or various other 
Marine Corps officers, nor do we minimize or ignore the 
seriousness of the allegations of violations of Morgan's 
constitutional rights. Indeed, in the usual case, a 
constitutional violation will preclude a finding that the 
government's conduct was substantially justified. See U.S. 
v. $12,248 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 
1991) ("[T]he government's position was not substantially 
justified because the government violated the claimant's 
Fifth Amendment Due Process rights . . ."). Rather, we 
merely state, that on this record, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding the government's position 
was substantially justified. Thus, for all of the above 
reasons, we will affirm the decision of the district court. 
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